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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 In 1988, Mayor Edward Koch asked me to chair what became the 1989 Charter 
Revision Commission. During the next year, the Commission proposed the most 
fundamental changes to New York City’s government since 1901. By a fifty-five to 
forty-five percent margin, the city’s voters approved the 1989 Commission’s new 
Charter. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) approved the changes under section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act.1
 Ten years later, in 1998, as part of his creative and steady stewardship of New 
York Law School’s Center for New York City Law, Professor Ross Sandler devoted 
two issues of the school’s Law Review to the One-Hundredth Anniversary of the 
Charter of the City of New York: Past, Present and Future, 1898–1998.2 Together with 
Eric Lane, the Executive Director and Counsel to the 1989 Charter Commission,3 I 
wrote a 282-page law review article about the 1989 Charter and Commission.4 This, 
much shorter, article draws heavily upon that work.
 In Part II, I offer comments about the substantive aspects of revising a Charter. 
These include the breadth of the task, which has ranged from the narrow and very 
specific to the 1989 Commission’s sweeping review. Charter Commissions must 
remember that they are a commission, not a legislature; a commission can lay a 
foundation, but others are then responsible for constructing the building. The 
fundamental task for all Charter Commissions is to improve government. However, 
at least for a Charter Commission engaged in major revisions, there are issues that 
are deeper than how the government does its work. The 1989 Commission, for 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2011). At the time, under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, New York City was 
required to obtain pre-clearance from the DOJ for any changes to its Charter that affect voting rights 
because three counties—Kings (Brooklyn), New York (Manhattan), and the Bronx—had had a restriction 
on voting (in the form of literacy tests) that had adversely affected minorities. But see Shelby Cnty. v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (holding section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional, effectively 
making section 5 preclearance inoperable until Congress enacts a new, up-to-date coverage formula).
2. See 42 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 689–1265 (1998) (issues 3 & 4).
3. Eric Lane had the same position with the previous Commission, chaired by Richard Ravitch. After the 
Ravitch Commission began to think about reforms to the City Charter, the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
April 1988, surprisingly decided to review the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision 
affirming the U.S. district court ruling that the city’s Board of Estimate was unconstitutional. Given 
this, the Ravitch Commission, as a practical—and political—matter, could not continue to focus on 
reforms that assumed the Board’s unconstitutionality. It was able, however, to propose (1) strengthening 
the ethical rules for city officials and employees and (2) “charterizing” the new City Campaign Finance 
Board. These two changes were approved by city voters at a referendum held in November 1988 (when 
I served as Co-Chair of the supporting Citizens Committee). The Ravitch Commission then expired 
under the law that terminates Charter Commissions at the earlier of a referendum or two years from the 
Commission’s appointment. N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 36(5)(b) (McKinney 2013). Four members 
of the Ravitch Commission did not run for positions on the 1989 Commission. Furthermore, other 
considerations affected the composition of the Commission. Specifically, Ravitch wanted to run for 
Mayor, Frank Macchiarola wanted to run for Comptroller, former Mayor Robert Wagner did not feel 
up to serving on the successor 1989 Commission and Fordham President Father Joseph O’Hare believed 
his service as Chair of the city’s Campaign Finance Board meant he shouldn’t serve.
4. Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Eric Lane, The Policy and Politics of Charter Making: The Story of the 1989 
Charter, 42 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 723 (1998).
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example, had to wrestle with racial tensions and concerns about Manhattan’s 
dominance of city governance at the expense of the other boroughs.
 Part III addresses the importance of process for Charter Commissions. In a 
democracy, process is always important. And process is particularly important for an 
unelected Charter Commission, which can have great power, but must ultimately 
persuade the public to vote for its proposals. The success of the 1989 Charter 
Commission was, I believe, highly correlated to it being representative and 
independent, as well as it having an extensive and open process of conversation with 
the public. By contrast, the proposals of the 1999 Commission established by Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani and the 2003 Commission established by Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg were both overwhelmingly rejected by the voters.5 Without regard to 
whether their proposals had merit, their defeats were, I believe, in part because those 
Commissions were not representative, were not independent, and did not engage the 
public in meaningful discussions. Part IV makes a few points about the balance of 
power created by the 1989 Charter as seen a quarter of a century later and offers 
some summary thoughts on future Charter revision efforts.
ii. sUbstantiVE aspECts Of ChartEr rEVisiOns
 A. Charter Commissions Usually Focus Narrowly, Rarely Broadly
 Technically, a Charter Commission is supposed to review the entire Charter.6 
However, Commissions generally limit their attention to those portions of the 
Charter they are required to, or choose to, review. Perhaps selectivity is necessary in 
New York City’s case because of the length and complexity of the City Charter. For 
instance, the New York City Charter totals nearly 200,000 words. By contrast, the 
original U.S. Constitution totaled about 4,400 words. In general, the more recent 
the constitution or charter and the lower the level of government, the longer and 
more detailed the document will be.
 In some cases, a Charter is changed because of a narrow, specific problem or issue. 
An example was a district court ruling that the Charter provision creating City 
Council Members who represented boroughs at large (two members for each borough), 
as opposed to representing individual districts within a borough, was unconstitutional.7 
Similarly, sometimes a Mayor appoints a Charter Commission and hopes—or 
demands—that the Commission focus only on one issue. An example is Mayor 
5. Elisabeth Bumiller, The 1999 Elections: Charter Revision; New York Voters Strongly Reject Charter Revision, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1999, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/03/nyregion/1999-
elections-charter-revision-new-york-voters-strongly-reject-charter-revision.html; Mike McIntire, The 
2003 Election: City Charter; Only Motivated Voters Ventured into the Voting Booth, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2003, 
at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/06/nyregion/2003-election-city-charter-only-
motivated-voters-ventured-into-voting-booth.html.
6. N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 36 (5)(a) (McKinney 2013); see also About the Commission, N.Y.C 
Charter Revision Comm’n, http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/html/about/about.shtml (last visited 
Aug. 15, 2013).
7. Andrews v. Koch, 528 F. Supp. 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff ’d, 688 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1982).
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Bloomberg’s creation of Commissions to examine non-partisan elections. In such 
circumstances, Charter Commissions have typically looked at the single issue and 
then perhaps considered a few other issues. For example, the 1983 Commission 
chaired by Michael Sovern, then the President of Columbia University, addressed the 
problems of the borough at-large Council Members by not altering the Charter. This 
effectively eliminated the posts. Yet the Sovern Commission also opted to change the 
method of redistricting Council seats after each decennial census.8
 The 1989 Commission’s task was unique in its breadth. The U.S. Supreme Court, 
in a unanimous decision, had declared unconstitutional the Board of Estimate, a 
pillar of the city’s governing structure.9 The Board’s power included everything from 
specific land use matters (e.g., the location of homeless shelters or zoning variances 
for particular real estate projects) to approving discretionary contracts (i.e., contracts 
not subject to competitive bidding). The Board also shared power over the budget 
with the City Council and the Mayor. The Board of Estimate had eight members. 
The three citywide elected officials (Mayor, Comptroller, and City Council President 
(now called Public Advocate)) each had two votes. The five Borough Presidents each 
had one vote.
 The specific constitutional problem was that the Board of Estimate violated the 
one-person-one-vote requirement of the U.S. Constitution by, for example, giving an 
equal vote to the Borough Presidents from Brooklyn and Staten Island, even though 
Brooklyn had approximately six times as many residents as Staten Island.10 Residents 
of Queens were similarly underrepresented while residents of the Bronx were 
overrepresented. We had to fix that constitutional problem and we did so by choosing 
to abolish the Board. But, as I said near the outset of our work, if we merely fixed the 
Board, then, “if we were to grade ourselves, we would get a passing grade, perhaps a 
high passing grade, but we won’t get high marks.”11 Eliminating the Board was 
necessary but not sufficient for the task. By aspiring for “high marks” and recognizing 
the interconnected structures of city government, our work resulted in fundamental 
and wide-ranging changes to city government.12
 If we did not create a solution that met with the approval of the city’s voters, the 
alternatives were bleak. Either a court would enforce a solution of its own, or another 
8. Julius Genachowski, Voters Back Proposals of Sovern Commission, Colum. Daily Spectator, Nov. 9, 
1983, available at http://spectatorarchive.library.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/columbia?a=d&d=cs19831109-
01.2.6&srpos=1512&dliv=none&st=1&e=-------en-20--1504--txt-IN-student+protest---. And only 
six years after the Sovern Commission’s Charter revisions, the 1989 Commission changed the 
redistricting provisions even though a number of its members had served on the Sovern Commission. 
See N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, Final Report of The New York City Charter Revision 
Commission: January 1989–November 1989, at 9 (1990). 
9. Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 701–02 (1989).
10. Id. at 692.
11. Minutes of the N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n Pub. Meeting 7 (Apr. 24, 1989) [hereinafter Apr. 24, 
1989 Public Meeting].
12. For a description of those changes, see Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at Part  II: The Structure and 
Processes of the New Government, 775–922. 
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Commission would have to come up with something else quickly. However, a court 
would have neither the power, nor the capacity, nor the will to fashion a multifaceted 
solution, as the 1989 Commission did. For example, even if a court transferred some 
of the Board of Estimate’s powers to the City Council, a court could not enlarge the 
City Council to make it more representative and more racially diverse. As for a new 
Charter Commission, it would be forced to rush for a prompt special election—
rather than a vote during a general election—when voter turnout would be low and 
the role of special interests would, therefore, be high.13
 For these reasons, the 1989 Commission believed it should strive to present at 
the November  1989 general election a comprehensive solution that cured the 
constitutional wrong being done to millions of New York City residents. But we took 
it upon ourselves to go beyond curing that specific problem and sought more 
sweeping change. What made this task more difficult is that this comprehensive new 
Charter had to win support from a majority of city voters.
 No other New York City Charter Commission has faced such broad and daunting 
challenges. The singularity of the circumstances might suggest that some of my 
general comments about appropriate Charter Commission characteristics—both 
substantive and procedural––are less applicable to other Commissions with relatively 
narrow challenges. Nonetheless, I believe my comments are broadly applicable. In 
fact, I have made similar comments about subsequent New York City Charter 
Commissions that were focusing on less sweeping issues.14
13. For a discussion of other problems that would have occurred if a new Charter had not been tendered to 
the voters in November 1989 or if the voters had rejected the proposed new Charter see Schwarz & 
Lane, supra note 4, at 760–65.
14. When Mayor Rudolph Giuliani appointed Charter Commissions in 1998 and again in 1999, I wrote 
very critical letters about the Commissions (1) not being representative, (2) not being independent, and 
(3) planning a truncated and rushed schedule which would prevent the necessary dialogue with, and 
dissemination of information to, the public. See Letter from Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore LLP, to Peter Powers, Chair, Charter Revision Commission (June 29, 1998); Letter 
from Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, to Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani 
(June 30, 1999); see also, David Firestone, Back on the Offensive for City Charter Guru, N.Y. Times, July 
3, 1998, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/03/nyregion/public-lives-back-on-the-
offensive-for-city-charter-guru.html; Michael Powell & Russ Buettner, In Matters Big and Small, 
Crossing Giuliani Had Price, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/01/22/us/politics/22giuliani.html.
  With respect to Mayor Bloomberg’s Charter Commissions, his first was appointed in 2002 in early 
July—too late to do a responsible job on anything important for that year, although the Mayor appointed 
a number of independent and thoughtful people to the Commission.
  The Commission agreed that it should not rush to get proposals on important matters on the 
ballot, and instead proposed only a relatively minor change on mayoral succession, saying there was 
insufficient time to address other issues, such as nonpartisan elections, that the Mayor had asked the 
Commission to consider.
  In 2003, Mayor Bloomberg, at the last minute (on March 26, 2003), appointed another 
Commission, chaired by Frank Macchiarola. See, Press Release, N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, 
Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg Announces Appointment of Frank J. Macchiarola as Chair of The 
Charter Revision Commission (Mar. 26, 2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/html/
archives/pr_030326.shtml. This time, the Mayor instructed the Commission to focus on nonpartisan 
elections for a referendum that year. As the Commission sat down to work, Chairman Macchiarola 
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 B. What a Charter Commission Is and Is Not
 A Charter Commission’s job is to provide a structure and process for governmental 
decisionmaking, not to make the decisions itself. A commission is not a legislature, 
nor should it act as one. As I said at one of our early public meetings, “our job [is] to 
increase the chance of good things happening . . . not to sit as a legislature deciding, 
from day-to-day, what those good things may be.”15 A metaphor helped explain the 
distinction:
[A] charter is the foundation, it is not the building. The charter allows for the 
building to be built, but the building has to be built by other people in future 
times.
 Whether the building will be one that  .  .  . is beautiful or  .  .  . dumpy, 
depends on  .  .  . whether elected officials are leaders, on their character, on 
their intelligence, on their visions, on their compassion. It depends on the 
people, on their participation, on their common sense, on their soul.16
 C. Enabling the Government to Work Well
 At the February 8, 2013 symposium held at New York Law School on Process, 
Power, and Lessons for the Future: 25 Years of New York City Charter Revisions, many 
speakers—starting with the keynote address by the current Corporation Counsel, 
Michael A. Cardozo17—concluded that the 1989 Charter  “works” because, among 
other things, it provides for a “workable structure for government to get things done” 
and for “a process that allows things to get done that is transparent, provides for 
participation and dissent, holds the players accountable, and legitimizes its outcomes.”18 
In the areas of budgets, land use, and procurement, Cardozo and many others referred 
announced on August 25, 2003 that the Commission would put a nonpartisan election proposal on the 
ballot that year. See Press Release, N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, Statement from Frank J. 
Macchiarola, Chairman, Charter Revision Commission (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.nyc.
gov/html/charter/html/archives/pr_030826.shtml; see also N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, 
Enhancing Access, Opportunity & Competition: A Blueprint for Reform: Final Report 
(Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/charter/downloads/pdf/final_report2003.pdf. 
  The rush to put the measure on the ballot was particularly appalling. In retrospect, this was sad for 
a few reasons. Mayor Bloomberg seems often to have an instinct for reform and the dominance by one 
party of all non-mayoral elections means ideas like some form of nonpartisan elections should be 
explored. But in this instance that instinct for reform was not coupled with an appreciation, on the part 
of the Mayor or the Commission Chair, for the tactics of reform or with any strategy to foster alliances 
in support of their proposal (beyond the Mayor spending enormous amounts of money). 
15. Apr. 24, 1989 Public Meeting, supra note 11, at 12.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Michael A. Cardozo, Reflections on the 1989 Charter Revisions, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 85 (2013–2014); 
Michael A. Cardozo, N.Y.C. Corp. Counsel, Keynote Address at the New York Law School Law Review 
Symposium: Process, Powers, and Lessons for the Future: 25 Years of New York City Charter Revisions 
(Feb. 8, 2013), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qzriP_oeP7A.
18. See Cardozo, Reflections on the 1989 Charter Revisions, supra note 17, at 87. The Corporation Counsel 
also praised the Charter’s provisions relating to government ethics and campaign finance. Those 
provisions, however, were the product of the Ravitch Commission. See supra text accompanying note 3.
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to two basic elements the 1989 Charter established: a strong Mayor with clear 
responsibilities, balanced by checks from the City Council and other sources.19
 That is correct.20 Under the 1989 Charter, the Mayor has, for example, a strong 
role in budgets, land use, and contracts. On budgets, the 1989 Commission made the 
key decision to retain the Mayor’s exclusive authority to set revenue estimates. And 
because the city must have a balanced budget, this puts a ceiling on city spending. 
This is a power not held by New York’s Governor or by even the President of the 
United States. Retaining this critical mayoral power was one of the few instances 
where I essentially cut off discussion about change.21
 On land use, the Mayor appoints the Chair as well as a majority of the members 
(seven of thirteen) of the City Planning Commission.22 Moreover, elimination of the 
Board of Estimate ended the ability of Mayors to evade responsibility for land use 
decisions by claiming they were approved by other officials. The same is true for 
discretionary contracts. The 1989 Charter granted the Mayor this responsibility.23 
Greater power was concentrated in the Mayor, but so was greater accountability.
 But the Charter also strengthened checks on the mayoralty. Most importantly, it 
strengthened the City Council. Simply eliminating the Board of Estimate did this—
more power and more attention f lowed to the Council. In addition, on land use, the 
Council’s approval would be needed for broad changes, such as in the zoning law. 
Even for specific land use approvals, the Council had power to call up matters for a 
vote in exceptional circumstances.24
 By definition, the Council is representative of the entire city; therefore some 
eighty percent of its members will not be from Manhattan. A more powerful Council 
would mean greater attention to the other boroughs. But we did other things to 
19. Cardozo, Reflections on the 1989 Charter Revisions, supra note 17, at 86–88.
20. The detail of all the substantive changes in the 1989 Charter is set forth at great length in my previous 
work. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at Part II: The Structure and Processes of the New 
Government, 775–922.
21. N.Y.C. Charter § 1515 (1989). See also Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 838–40 (discussing revenue 
estimating); Apr. 24, 1989 Public Meeting, supra note 11, at 104 (stating that diluting the Mayor’s 
responsibility would be “wrong substantively” and would undermine the city’s reputation with “bonding 
agencies and other people who judge the City of New York.”).
22. N.Y.C. Charter § 6 (1989). Originally, the Commission had considered having a majority of the City 
Planning Commission appointed by persons other than the Mayor. However, based on a number of 
arguments—including testimony from a group of the then-current (Robert Wagner,  Jr.) and former 
Chairs of the City Planning Commission—we changed our mind through several steps. See Minutes of 
the N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n Pub. Meeting 281–82 (June  20, 1989). For a more extensive 
discussion of these and related issues, see Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 856–66 (The Balance 
Between the City Planning Commission and the City Council).
23. For a more detailed discussion, see Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 880–99.
24. N.Y.C. Charter §§ 197-d(b)(3), 197-d(g), 192 (1989). This change to the Charter was the one that 
Eric Lane and I were most worried about. Specifically, would parochial—or “Not In My Back Yard” 
(NIMBY)—concerns by particular Council Members derail unpleasant but necessary land use 
placements? Fortunately, experience has not supported our worries. Moreover, the existence of the 
Council’s role in exceptional circumstances was one factor that led us to move to the seven-to-six 
mayoral majority on the City Planning Commission. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 864–66.
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assure there would be a “borough voice,” aside from Manhattan’s. These also added 
to checks on the mayoralty. Just continuing the Borough Presidents did some of that. 
But, in addition, the Borough Presidents were given specific checking and balancing 
roles on the budget, land use, and contracts.25
 Two other officials, the Comptroller and the Public Advocate, which was called 
the President of the City Council in 1989, also could act as mayoral checks. Elected 
citywide, these posts could also generate new ideas in what is essentially a one-party 
city. Our basic concept was that the Comptroller would concentrate on oversight of 
fiscal issues and the Public Advocate on program issues.26
 Finally, the 1989 Charter created new institutions for government transparency. 
By furnishing the press, the public, and public officials with more information, voters 
and public officials would have greater knowledge about an administration’s work 
and the state of the city, enabling more informed decisions.
 The most important of these new institutions was the Independent Budget Office 
(IBO),27 which was modeled on the respected Congressional Budget Office and the 
California Legislative Analyst. The IBO provides fiscal analyses to the public, City 
Council Members, and elected officials other than the Mayor. It is an independent, 
nonpartisan check on the Mayor’s powerful Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
 Both Mayors David Dinkins and Rudolph Giuliani fought against launching the 
IBO. It was funded only after two courts ordered the city to comply with the 
Charter.28 We correctly anticipated that future Mayors might seek to cripple the IBO 
by simply not funding it. On the day before our Commission finished its proposals, 
we added a provision to the Charter protecting the IBO’s budget.29 It was the first 
time any city agency had such a shield against mayoral, or Council, interference.30
25. N.Y.C. Charter § 82 (2013); Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 809–15, 838–40.
26. Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 818–21; N.Y.C. Charter § 93 (2013).
27. See N.Y.C. Charter §§ 259, 260 (2013). For a more detailed discussion of the IBO, see Schwarz & 
Lane, supra note 4, at 901–03.
28. Two cases in two years held that the Dinkins and Giuliani administrations had illegally refused to fund 
the IBO. See N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. Dinkins, 83 N.Y.2d 377 (1994); N.Y. Pub. Interest 
Research Grp. v. Giuliani, 644 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1st Dep’t 1996). After finally bowing to these court 
rulings, Mayor Giuliani still made unsuccessful attempts both to get the State Legislature to amend the 
Charter to eliminate the IBO and to have his 1998 Charter Revision Commission do so. See Clifford J. 
Levy, For Charter Panel, a Meaty Idea, but Will It Work?, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1998, at B4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/07/nyregion/for-charter-panel-a-meaty-idea-but-will-it-work.html.
29. N.Y.C. Charter § 259 (2013). Section 259 guarantees that the IBO will receive minimum 
appropriations not less than ten percent of the appropriations available to pay for the expenses of the 
OMB during any given fiscal year.
30. In 1998 New York City voters approved the 1998 Charter Revision Commission’s proposal to place 
additional restraints on the mayoralty with respect to protecting the New York City Campaign Finance 
Board’s budget. See Possible Ballot Proposal: Charter Revision Commission’s Proposal on Campaign Finance 
Reform, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., http://www.nyccfb.info/public/voter-guide/ballot_98/charter.
htm?sm=public. Specifically, the additional protection requires Campaign Finance Board budgets to be 
placed on the Mayor’s executive budget without change. N.Y.C. Charter § 1052(c) (2013).
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 The 1989 Charter added other measures to increase public information. A new 
Commission on Public Information and Communication was created to enhance 
public information about the government’s functions and workings.31 The new 
Charter also included requirements that certain information be made public.32
 Another new Charter provision required release of an annual public report on the 
status of the city’s “social, economic and environmental health.”33 The 1989 
Commission directed that the report include data using “generally accepted indices 
of unemployment, poverty, child welfare, housing quality, homelessness, health, 
physical environment, crime,” and other similar issues.34 In addition, the report had 
to show comparisons between the city’s “subdivisions” and between New York City 
and relevant national, regional, or other standards and averages.
 The philosophy, as stated in one of the Commission’s public hearings, was from 
Saint John: “Know the truth and the truth shall set you free.”35 The purpose was to 
empower the public and public officials with facts. Doing so would serve to check all 
of government, particularly the city’s powerful Mayors, who were responsible for 
administering city services.
 A related new provision was the “fair share” criteria for locating city facilities.36 
These provisions grew out of the fact that some communities were overburdened by 
undesirable city facilities, while also being underserved by desirable ones. This was a 
particular concern of poor and minority communities.37 But other communities, such 
as Staten Island, because of the large landfill at Fresh Kills, felt overburdened as well.
 The new Charter also required the city to develop “fair share” criteria to “further 
the fair distribution” of facilities.38 Moreover, the city had to consider the relative 
fairness of burdens—as well as benefits—during the land use process, much as the 
environmental laws of the late 1960s and early 1970s required governments to 
consider environmental factors, while not mandating specific results.
 In addition, each year the Mayor had to submit to the Council a citywide 
“Statement of Needs,” proposing city facilities for the next two years and using “fair 
share” criteria. Both the “fair share” rule and the “Statement of Needs” were designed 
to use the power of information to impose fairness and better planning, and to check 
the ability of Mayors to take unrestrained actions.
31. N.Y.C. Charter ch. 47 (2013).
32. Id. §§ 1058–1065. See also Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 904.
33. N.Y.C. Charter § 16 (2013). See also Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 906.
34. N.Y.C. Charter § 16 (2013). See also Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 906.
35. N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n Pub. Hearing 299–300 (July 20, 1989) (quoting John 8:32); see also 
Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 906–07.
36. See N.Y.C. Charter §§ 203, 204 (2013) (delineating criteria for the location of city facilities, and a 
citywide statement of needs). See also Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 870–72.
37. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n Pub. Hearing 390–93, 488–93 (Mar. 2, 1989).
38. See N.Y.C. Charter § 203(a) (2013).
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 D.  A Sound Charter, However, Does More Than Enable the Government to Work Well
 As I noted near the end of the second panel of the New York Law School 
conference, a Charter Commission can, and the 1989 Charter Commission did, 
address deeper questions than how the government should work.39
 It is not sufficient to have a government that works well. An efficient government 
that is unjust is worth little. The 1989 Charter Commission tried to focus on both 
effectiveness and justice. Take the information-enhancing provisions of the Charter 
as an example: these were meant to make the government more efficient by furnishing 
all city officials with more information. Moreover, while empowering all citizens 
and thus serving democracy, the added information also served justice by often 
addressing particular concerns of poor and minority communities.
 As Eric Lane and I analyzed in a section of our 1998 article The City as We Found 
It,40 we confronted a government that needed more than the fundamental structural 
change required by the ruling on the Board of Estimate’s unconstitutionality. We 
saw a city beset by “worries, concerns, and anger” that ran deeper than the form of 
government. The two most important concerns of the public were racial tensions and 
Manhattan’s dominance.41
 As for race, “[s]omething was seriously wrong with race relations in the City. A 
Charter that failed to address race relations—but only to the extent Charters can—
would leave behind a ticking time bomb for the City.”42 A major theme of the 
Commission’s work was to propose Charter revisions that would increase minority 
political opportunities and political participation.43
 When “The Chair’s Initial Proposals” were released on April 24, 1989, the first 
of the Commission’s six goals evoked the need for “fair representation.”44 The most 
important action in this respect—which also addressed the racial “ticking time 
39. Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School 
of Law, Senior Counsel, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, Panel Discussion at the New York Law School 
Law Review Symposium: Process, Powers, and Lessons for the Future: 25 Years of New York City 
Charter Revisions (Feb. 8, 2013), available at https://itunes.apple.com/us/itunes-u/process-powers-
lessons-for/id602324384?mt=10 (discussion beginning at 10:50 mark).
40. Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 743–48.
41. The third broad issue of concern that Eric Lane and I perceived was that the city was “essentially a one-
party city.” Yes, “[n]on-Democratic mayors were occasionally elected”—today, in 2013, one would say 
“have often been elected.” “But Democrats, from time immemorial, comprised the overwhelmingly 
dominant party in the City.” In 1989, the Republican Minority Leader on the City Council had a title, 
a car, and an office—but not one other fellow Republican to lead. We believed that multiparty 
competition can help develop better ideas and that party competition can increase voter interest and 
participation. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 747–48. Increasing the size of the City Council—
which, as discussed below, was done primarily to increase minority opportunity—was hoped to also 
increase party diversity. Lack of party competition also reinforced some of our ideas about the 
importance of making more information about government available.
42. Id. at 744.
43. Id. at 744–46; see also id. at 778–79 (providing a description of the Charter Revision Commission’s 
decision to increase the size of the City Council as a means to increase minority representation).
44. See Apr. 24, 1989 Public Meeting, supra note 11, at 4–7. 
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bomb”—was to expand the newly empowered City Council from thirty-five members 
to fifty-one members.45 Our aim was to create more opportunity for minorities to 
elect candidates of their own choice and to shrink the size of Council districts to 
enhance responsiveness to constituent needs, while simultaneously maintaining a 
Council of manageable size.46 The increased size of the Council did in fact lead to 
very substantive increases in minority representation.
 The proposed Charter revisions were due to come before the voters at the 1989 
election, at which time thirty-five Council Members would also be elected, along 
with all other city officials. Rather than wait for a new Council to be elected four 
years later in 1993, the 1989 Charter accelerated the next Council election by two 
years to 1991 so that the new body with fifty-one members would be elected sooner.47 
The 1989 Charter also created four offices related to equal opportunity and 
nondiscrimination.48
 The second issue on the minds of the city’s citizens was that “outer borough” 
residents believed they were “being shortchanged and that Manhattan was too 
dominant in governmental decision making.”49 The outer boroughs “sensed that they 
were eclipsed, dominated and overshadowed by Manhattan.”50 “In the view of many 
citizens and elected officials, the cultural, media, and financial center in Manhattan 
received too much of the City’s attention and money.”51 This concern led to a number 
of changes designed to continue a “borough voice”—which was particularly important 
to the four boroughs other than Manhattan.52
 The need to consider and respond to concerns about race and about Manhattan’s 
domination had a substantial impact on the 1989 Commission’s process, its 
substantive proposals about how to structure the new city government, and the 
political strategy designed to garner support in the 1989 referendum campaign.
 E. Need to Focus on the City’s Fundamental Problems 
 The Board of Estimate had been celebrated by highly regarded—indeed almost 
revered—city historians as “occupy[ing] the center of gravity in the City’s political 
45. For a discussion of the Council generally, see Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 716–806. For a 
discussion of the size of the Council, see id. at 782–88.
46. For a discussion of the Commission’s consideration of expanding the Council to fifty-nine members, 
and its decision not to do so because that option would produce no additional majority minority seats, 
see id. at 787–88.
47. For a discussion of the acceleration of the City Council election, including testimony in support by 
Roscoe Brown, then-President of One Hundred Black Men and President of the Bronx Community 
College, and, in general, the political as well as substantive importance of what we did with the Council, 
see id. at 801–08.
48. Id. at 909 n.784. 
49. Id. at 744.
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process,” “the most powerful single participant,” an “institutional success” with 
“extraordinary characteristics.”53 However, with only one dissent, our Commission 
voted to abolish the Board. The decision to do so was based upon my presentation of 
constitutional law, in which I concluded that the one-person-one-vote problem could 
not be cured by “weighted voting”—a concept that would, for example, “weight” the 
Board of Estimate votes of the Borough Presidents of Brooklyn and Staten Island so 
that Brooklyn would have approximately six times the votes of Staten Island. I told 
my colleagues this scheme would not pass constitutional muster.54 And I predicted 
the courts would hold neighboring Nassau County’s weighted voting scheme 
unconstitutional, which they did four years later.55
 There was a reason why we chose to emphasize the legal rationale for abolishing 
the Board. Because a number of the Commissioners and the institutions where they 
worked had important matters pending before the Board, reliance on my legal advice 
was safe for them. Discussions and votes based on substantive or policy problems 
with the Board would have been less so.56
 Nonetheless, substantive deficiencies of the Board underlay much of Eric Lane’s 
and my thinking about eliminating the Board. Those substantive deficiencies also 
influenced the Commission’s decisions about how to shape the new city government. 
An early exchange between Commissioner Bernard Richland (a former Corporation 
Counsel under Mayor Abraham Beame) who later dissented from eliminating the 
Board (and then dissented from all of the Commission’s recommendations) and me 
captures the point. Richland said the “basic problems of the City” were matters such 
as where homeless shelters should be located—a classic Board of Estimate issue. I 
responded:
The basic problems of the City are what we should be spending our money 
on, how we can act by legislation, or otherwise, to address our underlying 
social ills . . . .
 The basic problem of the City is—[using the subject of homelessness to 
make the point]—[h]ow do we avoid so many people having to go into 
shelters[?] And what should we be doing to help [the new government] 
structure be one that causes people to focus on what [are] really the basic 
problems of the City and not the manifestation of that in the last minute of 
the process[?]57
 That last sentence was a calculated slap at the Board of Estimate which, by 
concentrating on individual land use matters and discretionary contracts, and doing 
53. Wallace S. Sayre & Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City: Politics in the 
Metropolis 626–27 (W.W. Norton & Co., 1965); see also Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 767–68.
54. Minutes of the N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n Pub. Meeting 1–78 (May 2, 1989); see also Minutes of 
the N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n Pub. Meeting 14–16 (Mar. 31, 1989) [hereinafter Mar. 31, 1989 
Public Meeting]; Apr. 24, 1989 Public Meeting, supra note 11, at 88–91.
55. See Jackson v. Nassau Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
56. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 768–71.
57. Apr. 24, 1989 Public Meeting, supra note 11, at 36–37.
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so at the very end of the process, had “contributed to the City’s tendency to move 
from crisis to crisis without giving sufficient attention to the fundamental problems 
underlying or causing the crises.”58 The Board also threw a “stunting shadow” over 
the Council.59
 While newspapers and politicians firmly believed the Board was all-powerful, it 
actually exercised little genuine power. It did have power over individual city 
transactions, such as contracts and particular land use decisions. The media obsession 
with the Board’s bi-weekly late-night meetings—at which staff aides cast their 
bosses’ votes—fed the notion that the Board’s playing field was where the real game 
was played. Yet, the Board did not set policy. It did not consider “the basic problems 
of the City.” Moreover, although Mayors generally dominated the Board, they and 
all other Board members could duck responsibility if a decision was later criticized or 
turned out badly, by saying that all who voted “aye” shared responsibility. Indeed, 
one mayoral aide testified that Mayors’ efforts to maximize votes on Board decisions 
were part of an “unaccountability” policy.60 The Board of Estimate had the problems 
of a multimember executive that Alexander Hamilton discussed in his Federalist 
Paper No. 70.61
 The Board’s highly publicized last-minute frenzy of voting on specific deals 
diverted attention from the city’s underlying problems. And the Board’s prominence 
weakened the City Council. In addition, the evidence showed that, with respect to 
budgets, where the Board shared power with the City Council, it was the Council 
that focused more on the city’s fundamental issues.62
iii. prOCEss is CrUCiaL fOr a ChartEr rEVisiOn COMMissiOn
 In the 1989 Charter, substance—a strong Mayor with clear responsibilities, 
balanced by countervailing power in the Council and other offices, and all imbued 
with efforts to enhance fairness—was vital. For me, however, how those 
recommendations were formulated was equally important. The attention to process 
indicated the Commission’s belief that we should reach out to, and could learn from, 
all New Yorkers, and that our recommendations need not only gain voter approval, 
but that New Yorkers of all classes, races, ethnicities, and neighborhoods needed to 
perceive the process as just and fair. Eloquence and erudition is one thing. Winning 
the trust of the people is another.
58. Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 772.
59. Id. at 771.
60. See id. at 771–74.
61. The Federalist No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
62. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 754. Similarly, Eric Goldstein, an environmental attorney at the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), praised the Council for having been the “major 
environmental catalyst in recent years.” Eric A. Goldstein, Environmentalists Favor Revised City Charter, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1989, at A26, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/31/opinion/ 
l-environmentalists-favor-revised-city-charter-892889.html.
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 This is particularly important for an unelected Charter Revision Commission. 
While the public can reject a Commission’s proposals at a referendum, all they can 
offer is “yes” or “no.” A representative and independent Charter Commission that 
also has an open, iterative, and extensive public process builds a Commission’s 
legitimacy. Indeed, I am convinced that the extensive changes proposed by the 1989 
Commission would not have succeeded with the voters, and might well have failed 
with the DOJ, if the Commission had not had these qualities.
 A Charter Revision Commission should be representative, independent, and open 
and engaged with the public. The 1989 Commission had all of these features, which 
I believe were essential to our success. While recognizing that the 1989 Commission’s 
task was singularly daunting and that its reforms were uniquely far-reaching, these 
characteristics are appropriate for all Charter Commissions, and increase the 
likelihood that a Charter Commission’s revisions will win approval at the polls.
 Charter Commissions need to listen to and engage in a dialogue with the public, 
with experts on city government, and with elected officials. You learn. Despite the 
fine resumes of most Charter Commission members, a Commission has little 
inherent credibility or authority. If a Commission’s membership is not representative 
of the municipality whose rules it seeks to change, it will be harder to generate public 
support. A Commission is also weakened if there is a perception that it is an 
instrument of the city’s powerful officials or institutions. While a Mayor may be 
within his or her legal rights to try to dominate or control a Charter Commission’s 
agenda, the effort may well prompt a backlash by the voters.
 A. Representative
 In 1986, shortly after the U.S. district court held the Board of Estimate 
unconstitutional,63 and while I was still Corporation Counsel, I urged Mayor Koch 
to appoint a Charter Commission. My reasoning was that the court’s decision was 
likely to be affirmed and, if it was, the city would be under pressure to cure the 
constitutional wrong quickly. For those reasons, I believed that a Commission should 
be appointed to start the complex and difficult thinking about possible reforms in 
the event that the decision was affirmed. Koch agreed and announced his plan to 
appoint a Commission—even though he knew his decision would be extremely 
unpopular with all his colleagues on the Board of Estimate.64
 Koch also agreed that eight other elected officials should each be asked to give 
him the names of three potential Commission members. From those, he would 
appoint eight of the fifteen members of the Commission. Yet no appointee would be 
63. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp. 1463 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), aff ’d, 831 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1987), 
aff ’d, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). See also Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 739–40.
64. After Koch announced he would appoint a Commission, the other members of the Board came to his 
office to protest the decision. They were accompanied by former federal Judge Simon Rifkind of Paul, 
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, who joined the protest. The group suggested that Rifkind 
represent the city in further litigation. We declined the suggestion—really a demand—saying that the 
Corporation Council’s office would faithfully represent the city, as it in fact did under my successor, 
Peter Zimroth.
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told who had suggested his or her name. The eight other elected officials were the 
Comptroller, the Public Advocate, the leader of the Council (now called Council 
Speaker), and the five Borough Presidents. All eight suggested three names and from 
each list Koch appointed a Commissioner who met Koch’s high standards. They, 
plus seven others appointed by Koch from among his own list of names, became the 
1988 Charter Revision Commission, also known as the Ravitch Commission, after 
its Chair, Richard Ravitch.65
 Later, when I was asked to chair what became the 1989 Commission, there were 
three vacancies, in addition to the chairmanship that I filled. I urged Koch to include 
at least two minorities in those other slots. He did. This increased minority membership 
on the Commission from four to six, or from twenty-six percent to forty percent.
 Increased minority membership clearly helped with the Commission’s vital 
missions of reducing racial tension, developing a coalition to support the referendum, 
and winning DOJ approval. The effect of having eight appointees to the original 
Commission drawn from names suggested by other officials to the Mayor is harder 
to prove. However, I believe it did contribute to the diversity of views and backgrounds 
on the 1989 Commission.66 This, in turn, spurred the Commission to engage in 
extensive discussion and debate that led to more creative and effective proposed 
reforms.
 B. Independence 
 Under the law, members of a Charter Commission, once appointed, cannot be 
fired; they serve until the earlier of two years or placement of a proposal on the ballot 
for voters to consider. 67 A Mayor has the power to try to dictate what a Charter 
Commission should do and when it should do it. I believe, however, that such efforts 
are often counterproductive, and account for the voters overwhelmingly rejecting 
Charter proposals made by the Charter Commissions appointed by Mayors Giuliani 
and Bloomberg in 1999 and 2003.68
 In contrast, in 1989, with only one exception, Koch and his aides made all their 
suggestions and critiques in public letters to the Commission. Thus, the positions 
and reactions of Mayor Koch and his administration were part of the Commission’s 
open and transparent process. As Commissioner Mario Paredes said at the end of 
our work, Mayor Koch “was the only public official that never called me or pressured 
me or talked to me about absolutely any issue . . . .”69
65. See supra text accompanying note 3.
66. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 1014–15 (discussing backgrounds of the members of the 1989 
Commission).
67. See N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 36 (McKinney 2013).
68. See Powell & Buettner, supra note 14; David Seifman, Voters Shoot Down Mike’s Vote Reform, N.Y. Post, 
Nov. 5, 2003, at 2, available at http://wirednewyork.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4216&s=1364fb699
afb2bcc3b3b0b71c3d03709.
69. Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 762 n.129.
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 My own appointment is a further illustration of Koch’s judgment to not attempt 
to control the Commission behind the scenes. When he asked me to chair the 
Commission, he said nothing about the results he wanted. In addition, while we had 
a trusting, close, and friendly relationship when I was his Corporation Counsel from 
1982 through 1986, as well as afterward, he knew that the positions I took represented 
my own independent thoughts. Indeed, the last communication between us before his 
invitation to me to chair the Commission had been a letter from me to the Mayor 
criticizing him for his comments about Jesse Jackson in the 1988 presidential primary.70
 The one exception to Koch’s practice of communicating on the public record 
occurred just six days after the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the lower 
court ruling that the Board of Estimate was unconstitutional, which meant that our 
Commission could begin to publicly explore major reforms of the city’s government. 
Koch invited Eric Lane and me to dinner at Gracie Mansion. Joining us were the 
Corporation Counsel, Peter Zimroth, and the First Deputy Mayor, Stanley 
Brezenoff. After the usual fine food, wine, and conversation, Koch and his colleagues 
said that pushing for a referendum in 1989 would be harmful. They said it would 
harm the city if we were to make the Charter decisions in 1989, an election year 
when the Mayor would be seeking a fourth term. It was inevitable, they argued, that 
the Charter debate would be racially polarizing. Koch indicated that he did not want, 
or need, that.
 I replied that we could not agree to delay. The city’s system of government had 
been held unconstitutional, and not for some technical, trivial reason, but because 
some four million New Yorkers’ right to vote was being diluted. This unconstitutional 
wrong should not be allowed to fester. Moreover, if we did not place something on 
the ballot in 1989, no court would allow a full additional year. Therefore, we would 
face a special election early in 1990. To decide to go that way would be irresponsible, 
I said, because special elections had a history of abysmal voter turnouts. Low voter 
turnout tends to favor special interests, which we believed would oppose a new 
Charter.71 I added that I would not lead a group that would have a racially divisive 
impact.
 When the Commission met two days later to discuss the issue of timing, we 
voted unanimously to “strive” to place proposed Charter revisions on the November 
1989 ballot.72 The word “strive” ref lected recognition that our task was daunting, 
that there was a lot of work to do, and that we should not place our proposals on the 
ballot in November unless they had been adequately considered.73
70. See Letter from Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, to Edward Irving Koch, 
Mayor of the City of New York (Apr. 25, 1988) (on file with author).
71. These points and some further reasons not to delay are elaborated further. See Schwarz & Lane, supra 
note 4, 760–62.
72. See Mar. 31, 1989 Public Meeting, supra note 54, at 3–6, 26; Minutes of the N.Y.C. Charter Revision 
Comm’n Pub. Meeting 48–56 (Aug. 2, 1989).
73. Concluding that it was responsible to act in 1989 was helped by work previously done by the Ravitch 
Commission. When the U.S. Supreme Court decided to hear the Board of Estimate case, the Ravitch 
Commission stopped its work considering reforms to the structure of city government. Nonetheless, the 
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 C. Openness and Engagement with the Public
 Having a process that was open and engaged with the public was crucial to the 
success of the 1989 Commission. For the 1989 Commission, these characteristics 
were all related to our view of what was legitimate, as well as what would help us 
prevail at the polls in gaining voter approval of our proposals. Good policy was also 
good politics.
  1. Open Meetings 
 At the outset, we decided every meeting of the 1989 Commission would be 
public and transcribed.74 The Ravitch Commission had held closed some meetings, 
and Eric Lane did not believe that openness was required by New York’s Open 
Meetings Law,75 a view I did not fully share. Legal requirements aside, we concluded 
that the Commission’s interests would be better served by letting the public see our 
work. Allowing and encouraging public observation of our efforts would demystify 
our actions and dampen any sense that we were “acting upon” instead of “acting for” 
the public. Public debate also makes narrow-minded views more difficult to express.
 Initially, the idea of open meetings met some token resistance—expressed to me 
individually and in private—by a few Commission members who wondered whether 
they could speak as fully in public as they might in private, or, alternatively, 
questioned whether the Commission’s efforts would be harmed by having 
Commissioners airing differences in public. In the end, however, all seemed to agree 
with open meetings, although the Commission took no vote on this.
 In retrospect, open meetings did serve their intended purposes. Open meetings did 
not restrain debate; indeed, they probably sharpened it because of the constant public 
feedback we received. We were never criticized for making secret deals. Moreover, 
among those who closely followed the Charter discussions, our openness increased 
understanding of the issues, of the necessary trade-offs, and of the enormous complexity 
of what we were doing. Openness helped develop supporters, including from editorial 
boards,76 and moderated the tenor of opponents’ rhetoric. Our transparency also aided 
with the DOJ because process was an important consideration for it in granting pre-
clearance of the Charter revisions under the Voting Rights Act.77
preliminary research that the Commission had done was useful for the eleven holdover Commissioners 
who served on the 1989 Commission and for the many holdover members of staff, including Eric Lane, 
who I promptly concluded would be valuable—really essential—to retain.
74. No previous Charter Commission had held every meeting in public. Even when Commissions had held 
public meetings, the meetings often had not been transcribed. The 1975 (and earlier) Charter 
Commissions (and much of the Ravitch Commission) did not transcribe their meetings, and now there 
is no record of those meetings for historians, lawyers, or others to examine. See N.Y.C. Charter Revision 
Comm’n Pub. Meeting 91–92 (May 15, 1989) (remarking on the unfortunate absence of a record of the 
deliberations of the 1975 Goodman Charter Revision Commission).
75. See N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 103 (McKinney 2013). 
76. For our efforts with editorial boards, see Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 974–87.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2011).
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 But openness did not mean there was no room for private conversations I had with 
individual Commission members. For example, I telephoned individual members, 
talked to them before meetings, and spoke with them in corridors at meetings. 
Reasons for such discussions included describing upcoming issues and why a particular 
course seemed sensible, asking a particular Commissioner to take the lead on a 
particular proposal, and indicating how a particular Charter provision might be 
helpful in attracting support. Openness does not prevent individual persuasion.
  2. The Extent of the 1989 Commission’s Process
 When the 1989 Commission convened in January of that year, the U.S. Supreme 
Court still had not decided the Board of Estimate case. For the Commission to “choose 
[then] to do nothing would be to make a choice, to tie our hands as far as the option 
of taking action this year.”78 Therefore, at the suggestion of Director of Research 
Frank Mauro, we proposed that the Commission hold a series of six “legislative 
hearings to examine the workings of City government.”79 The six legislative hearings 
covered (1) local voice in government, (2) contracting and procurement, (3) land use 
decisionmaking, (4) oversight and representation, (5) franchising, and (6) budgeting. 
Each hearing lasted a full day. The hearing transcripts ran more than 2500 pages.
 The breadth of those hearings sent an important, though unstated, message 
about our work: Charter revision was likely to be extensive, further suggesting a 
government without a Board of Estimate.
 These hearings had value in addition to being informative. First, they showed the 
Commission’s open and professional approach to its work. Second, the hearings built 
a record for some later proposals. For instance, what ultimately became the IBO, the 
“fair share” policy for the distribution of city facilities, and the remedies for the city’s 
“slow pay” practices with contractors all stemmed from concerns aired at the hearings, 
as did our decisions to rectify certain weaknesses in city government that were 
epitomized by the Board of Estimate. The hearings also built support for enhancing 
the power of the City Council because they showed that the Council had recently 
focused more on citywide needs than had the more parochial Board of Estimate.
 In the four-plus months after the Supreme Court decision, the 1989 Commission 
held twenty public meetings where the Commission members debated ideas, worked 
toward reaching conclusions, and formulated proposed Charter language,80 and held 
fourteen public hearings all over the city where citizens were able to provide their 
78. Minutes of the N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n Pub. Meeting 3 (Jan. 20, 1989).
79. For discussion on this subject generally, see Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 753–54.
80. The Commission’s road to consensus is discussed throughout the 1998 article. See, e.g., id. at 925–41.
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suggestions for change and comment on our tentative proposals.81 The transcripts of 
these meetings and hearings exceed 13,000 pages.82
  3. Making the Commission’s Broad Goals Public
 We wanted the public to know our goals and what we specifically wanted to 
attain. Eric and I decided that publicly elaborating our goals would serve several 
important purposes: it would provide a touchstone for the Commission’s deliberations; 
provide logic, rationale, and context for decisions; and link Commission decisions to 
more universal principles, particularly those embedded in the American constitutional 
experience. Setting public goals would also provide the public with an instrument to 
measure our proposals. We decided that any danger of creating a target for the 
Commission’s critics was far outweighed by the benefits.
 The goals I announced were:
1.  First and foremost, there is the goal of fair representation. The one-
person-one-vote idea . . . is not just a formula; it is the heart of 
democracy. And fair representation also means the legal, but 
more importantly, the moral imperative that underlies the Voting 
Rights Act.
2.  Balancing power, checking power, is really in the bones of Americans. 
That is part of the genius of our Constitution . . . .
3.  Fixing accountability and clarifying responsibility. You do not want 
a government in which it is vague who has made a decision, then 
everybody can say they are not responsible . . . .
4.  [H]ave the government operate efficiently. If it does not . . . then 
the needs of the public cannot be met because there are too many 
roadblocks in getting from the policy goal to the implementation 
of that goal.
81. At these public hearings some 679 witnesses came to press, pummel, and occasionally praise our work. 
But praise was generally limited and reserved until after our proposals were finalized because advocates, 
naturally, continued to advocate until the very end.
  To help with outreach, these public hearings were not limited to Manhattan or even to traditional 
downtown areas in any borough. Indeed, eighty-seven percent of our public hearings (other than in 
Staten Island) were held in community districts with greater than fifty percent minority populations. 
For further discussion of our public outreach, see Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 756–60. Two 
hearings were limited to representation issues. See Letter from Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., Chairman, 
N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, and Eric Lane, Executive Director, N.Y.C. Charter Revision 
Comm’n, to Richard Posner, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 4–5 (Sept. 26, 1989).
82. During the four-plus months between the Supreme Court’s decision and when the Commission had to 
finish in order to assure that its proposals made the deadline for the referendum ballot, I spent about 
ninety percent of my time on Charter business—having luckily won the major case I was then handling 
for my law firm on the same day as the U.S. Supreme Court decision. The same pace continued for the 
DOJ submission and the referendum campaign. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 942–1013. 
Throughout the whole period, Eric Lane and his excellent staff were, of course, devoting one hundred 
percent of their time to Charter issues.
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5.  [C]oncentrate on the fundamental problem . . . and concentrate, at 
the outset, on what you can do to alleviate the problem, instead of 
focusing on the problem when it has arisen in crisis and you’re 
trying to address the problem on the margins.
6.  [I]ncrease the participation of all levels of government and of the 
people in the things [that] affect their lives.83
 These goals were rooted in America’s constitutional history and broader thinking 
about constitutional government. They were also a product of the specific New York 
City environment in which the Commission was born. Fair representation (in the 
one-person-one-vote sense) created the need for the Commission; and fair 
opportunity for all races and groups for representation was high on the list of the 
city’s immediate needs. In a city without a f lourishing two-party system, a system of 
checks and balances was particularly important. Weakness in fixing accountability 
and clarifying responsibility had been a substantive problem with the Board, and 
therefore city government. The need to enhance efficiency is ever present for 
government. A lack of concentration on the fundamental problems, and instead a 
focus on crises, had been a weakness of the Board and the city in general.84 The need 
to increase participation is clear for all democracies, and was particularly important 
given New York City’s racial problems.
 The early articulation of the Commission’s goals in such broad terms also 
signaled something important for the Commission’s future: while the specifics were 
still to be developed, we would move toward those specifics in an open way, based on 
an iterative exchange with the public in turn based on values and facts.
  4. The Iterative Nature of the Process
 In a compressed time, the 1989 Commission engaged in an extensive, and 
iterative, public process. After several months of work (including the six legislative 
hearings referred to above) and benefitting from extensive staff work, I laid out for 
the Commission and the public the Chair’s tentative ideas for change in April 1989.85 
Just as was true for setting out our goals, this had risks. As we learned more, it was 
inevitable that Commission members, Eric, and I would come up with new or better 
ideas. Ultimately, the initial proposals were substantially improved. But putting the 
proposals forward was worthwhile to get the ball rolling, again demonstrating our 
openness, and lead.
83. Apr. 24, 1989 Public Meeting, supra note 11, at 4–7. The goals announced at the public meeting were 
followed by substantial ensuing discussion and elaboration, including a response by Committee Vice Chair 
Harriet Michel that expressed happiness that we had “rais[ed] the stakes of what we are doing to try to get 
at those kind of philosophical goals.” Id. at 58; see also Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 751–52.
84. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 751.
85. Frederick A.O. Schwarz, New Agencies, New Rules: Excerpts from Charter Proposals, N.Y. Times, April 
25, 1989, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/25/nyregion/new-agencies-new-rules-
excerpts-from-charter-proposals.html.
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 The Chair’s initial proposals were discussed and debated by the Commission, 
and accepted, amended, or rejected during the course of seven public meetings. Next, 
the Commission offered its preliminary proposals for public comment.86 After a 
month of public comment and seven public hearings on these, the Commission then 
met to continue its own deliberations in seven more public meetings over the course 
of a month. After these deliberations, the Commission issued its refined and altered 
proposals for another round of public comment, including five more public hearings. 
This was followed by still another round of public meetings, leading to our final 
recommendations.
 In addition to being extensive and open, the Commission’s process connected 
with real people who had varied reactions and ideas. My colleagues sometimes teased 
me for “listening to death.” Indeed, I often permitted speakers at our public hearings 
to exceed the usual three-minute time limit. This resulted in many public hearings 
extending past midnight. Throughout, however, it was important both to listen and 
to appear to be listening. Even substantive critics of the Commission praised the 
fairness of our process.87 In addition, in the later stages of our public hearings, we 
began to use responses to questions to advocate for our proposals.88
IV.  THE BALANCE OF POwER UNDER THE 1989 CHARTER FROM THE PERSPECTIVE 
Of tWEntY-fiVE YEars LatEr
 Any Charter revisions must be evaluated in light of the need for a government 
that “works” and is just. The 1989 Commission intended to, and did, create a 
powerful, accountable Mayor with clear responsibilities. Given a strong Mayor, it 
also was particularly important to have other elements of government act as checks 
and balances. We also believed that these elements could be additional sources of 
creative solutions to the city’s problems.
 Checking power, particularly the executive’s, is “really in the bones of Americans; 
it is part of the genius of our Constitution.”89 In addition, two of New York City’s 
eternal concerns—racial angst and anxiety about Manhattan domination—bolstered 
the notion of checks and balances to a strong Mayor. This article, and our 1998 
article, makes these points about the City Council, the Borough Presidents, and the 
Public Advocate—as well as about the IBO.90
86. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 756.
87. See id. at 769. 
88. See id. at 945–46. For example, “[w]e were able to use [] quotes about the Commission’s openness and 
responsiveness from leaders of the minority community such as David Dinkins, Roscoe Brown, and the 
New York State NAACP,” to advocate for our proposals. Id. at 946.
89. Id. at 752. 
90. For a discussion of the IBO see id. at 901. For a discussion of the Borough President see id. at 906. For 
discussion of the City Council see id. at 785. For a discussion of the Public Advocate see id. at 815.
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 Since 1989, the City Council’s power relative to the mayoralty has been reduced 
by term limits.91 If there is a further look at the basic balance of power in New York 
City government, the first question should be whether a norm of two terms for 
Council Members inappropriately weakens the Council vis-à-vis the Mayor and 
continues the trend of Council Members, including the Speaker, being excessively 
focused on their next job. Any Charter revision that further increases the power of 
the Mayor by limiting the role of the Council, or by eliminating Borough Presidents 
or the Public Advocate, should and would face a high hurdle both substantively and 
politically.92
 There have been too many Charter Commissions since 1989. This does not mean 
that any questions should be off the table. But Charter fatigue may well make it 
harder to have a robust Charter revision process which the public takes seriously. 
And, of course, to be credible, and to increase the likelihood of prevailing, a Charter 
Commission should be representative and independent, and should have a serious, 
open, and extensive dialogue with the public.
91. See Douglas Muzzio, Bloomberg Moves to Change the City Charter, But How?, Gotham Gazette (Mar. 
8, 2010), http://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/open-government/467--bloomberg-moves-to-
change-the-city-charter-but-. On November 2, 2010, New York City voters approved proposals of the 
2010 Charter Revision Commission to restore two term limits for elected officials. See Javier Hernandez, 
Once Again, City Voters Approve Term Limits, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 2010, at P12, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/11/03/nyregion/03limits.html. 
92. For discussion of the roles of the Public Advocate and Borough Presidents in New York City government, 
respectively, see Lucas Anderson, Promoting an Effective and Responsive City Government by Retaining 
and Strengthening the Office of the Public Advocate, N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 165 (2013–2014); Gregory 
Perrotta, A Case for and Against the Borough President in Twenty-First Century New York City, N.Y.L. 
Sch. L. Rev. 193 (2013–2014).
